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“HISTORIC” IN A BAD WAY: HOW THE 
TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT 
CONTINUES THE AMERICAN TRADITION 
OF PROVIDING INADEQUATE 
PROTECTION TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND 




I. ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE THE OTHERS 
Four different men, Earl Pratt of Massachusetts, Wendell Lee 
Strickland of Arkansas, Ronnie Tom of Washington, and Tommy Lee 
Johnson of Texas, committed heinous crimes against children.
1
  Each man 
raped a seven-year-old child in his respective state, and each was convicted 
and sentenced for his crime.
2
  Despite general disdain for egregious crimes 
such as rape (whether of man, woman, or child), our justice system treats 
one of these men very differently from the rest.  Pratt received a twenty-
five-to-thirty-year sentence in Massachusetts,
3
 Johnson received twenty 
years in Texas,
4
 and Strickland received an eighteen-year sentence in 
 
* I would like to thank my family and friends for their support: specifically, Heidi 
Hansberry, Katie Pulaski, Will Singer, and Simon Springett for their thoughtful edits; 
Professor Steven G. Calabresi for his mentorship; Michael Potere, Lauren Cohen, Becca 
Felsenthal, Jen Won, Peter Siegal, Logan Wayne, and Anne Harris for their encouragement; 
and my parents, Joe and Jan Owens, for believing in everything I do.  This Comment is 
dedicated to the Blackfeet Nation; thank you for always making me feel at home in Indian 
Country.  Nitsíniyi’taki! 
1 See Strickland v. State, No. CACR09-1286, 2010 WL 3566725 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 
2010); Kerry Drennan, Court Convicts Repeat Drunken Driver, Sentences Rapist, LUBBOCK 
AVALANCHE-J., Feb. 4, 2003, at A8; Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken: A 
Dysfunctional System Lets Serious Reservation Crimes Go Unpunished and Puts Indians at 
Risk, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_7429560; Man Sentenced for Raping 7-Year-Old: Girl Raped in 2006, BOS. CHANNEL 
(July 22, 2009), http://www.thebostonchannel.com/r/20141357/detail.html. 
2 See sources cited supra note 1. 
3 Man Sentenced for Raping 7-Year-Old: Girl Raped in 2006, supra note 1. 
4 Drennan, supra note 1. 
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Arkansas.
5
  But Ronnie Tom served less than two years in a Colville Indian 
jail in the state of Washington because the Assistant United States Attorney 
in Spokane, Washington, declined to prosecute him, and federal laws 
prohibited the tribe from exacting a greater sentence.
6
 
On a winter night in 2003, Ronnie Tom attempted to rape his live-in 
girlfriend’s twelve-year-old sister.7  The girl managed to escape Tom’s 
attack, but he redirected his assault to his girlfriend’s seven-year-old 
daughter.
8
  Unfortunately, Tom succeeded in his vicious crime.
9
  Although 
an “expert forensics interviewer found the [seven-year-old’s] testimony 
recounting the rape clear and credible,” Tom was never charged with a 
felony.
10
  Tom is now living with his girlfriend and their young daughter,
11
 
despite a sexual-predator profile warning that Tom “should never be 
allowed to be alone with children, including his own, or live ‘near places 
designed for children, such as schools, playgrounds (or) swimming 
pools.’”12 
Why is it that Tom is home with his child, free to offend again, while 
others who committed similar crimes have been locked away for decades?  
Tom was not proven to be less culpable for his crime than his fellow 
offenders; there was no determination of insufficient evidence, nor was 
there any prosecutorial or police misconduct causing the case to be 
dismissed on a technicality.  The differences between Tom and the other 
convicted child rapists are race and location.  Because Tom is a Colville 
Indian
13
 who committed his crime on the Colville Indian reservation in 
 
5 Strickland, 2010 WL 3566725, at *1. 





11 This is particularly disturbing considering that “[s]ex offenders who commit acts of 
sexual violence against children have one of the highest rates of recidivism among all 
criminals . . . .”  Krista L. Blaisdell, Note, Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First 
Century: Analyzing Computer and Internet Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1155, 1192 (2009) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS, SUMMARY FINDINGS). 
12 Riley, supra note 1. 
13 Scholars use varied terms to refer to the United States’ indigenous people.  Legal 
scholarship often refers to “Indians” while other fields use the term “Native Americans.”  
Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and 
Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 455 n.2 (2005); see also STEPHEN 
CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988).  
This Article will use the terms interchangeably. 
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eastern Washington, his case falls under federal jurisdiction.
14
  In Tom’s 
case the Assistant United States Attorney (located 150 miles away in 
Spokane, Washington) declined to prosecute, as they do in 65% of cases 
coming from Indian Country.
15
  The Colville Tribal Court was constrained 
by federal legislation capping sentences delivered by tribal courts to one 
year of incarceration per crime, a $5,000 fine, or both.
16
  The tribe charged 
and convicted Tom for his crime and a separate incident involving Tom’s 
girlfriend’s twelve-year-old sister, resulting in less than two years of 
incarceration in tribal jail, the maximum penalty the tribe could impose.
17
 
Unfortunately, the story of Ronnie Tom is an all-too-common reality 
for American Indian and Alaska Native people living in the United States’ 
domestic dependent nations (Indian Country).  American Indian and Alaska 
Native people suffer from a disproportionately high rate of rape and sexual 
assault.
18
   
 
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006) (giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction 
over “[a]ny Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other 
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, 
a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury . . . , an assault against an 
individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country”).  
Note that the statute was amended in 1986, substituting “a felony under chapter 109A” for 
“rape, involuntary sodomy, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not 
attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape.”  Sexual Abuse Act of 
1986, Pub. L. 99-654, § 3(a)(5), 100 Stat. 3660, 3663. 
15 Riley, supra note 1. 
16 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2006).  Originally 
limiting tribal courts to sentences of six months or fines of $500, or both, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA) was amended in 1986 to allow harsher penalties.  See Indian Alcohol and 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 
Stat. 3207-146 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994)) (“No Indian tribe in 
exercising powers of self-government shall . . . impose for conviction of any one offense any 
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, 
or both . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Section 1302 was further amended in 2010 to allow 
punishment of up to three years or $15,000 if the crime was punishable by more than one 
year were it prosecuted federally.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (Supp. IV 2011). 
17 Riley, supra note 1.  The almost-two-year sentence was possible because Tom was 
charged with misdemeanors stemming from the rape of the seven-year-old and another 
substantive crime involving a previous incident with the twelve-year-old.  If Tom had been 
charged with one substantive crime, e.g., just charges stemming from the rape of the seven-
year-old, the tribal court would have lacked authority to sentence Tom to more than one year 
incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2006) (precluding tribal courts from having jurisdiction over several enumerated 
crimes, including rape). 
18 AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 2 (2007). 
500 JASMINE OWENS [Vol. 102 
Data gathered by the US Department of Justice indicates that Native American and 
Alaska Native women are more than 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually 
assaulted than women in the USA in general . . . .  [M]ore than one in three [Native 
American and Alaska Native women] will be raped during their lifetime; the 
comparable figure for the USA as a whole is less than one in five.
19
   
And while the assaults on American Indian and Alaska Native women are 
more violent than rapes suffered by the general population,
20
 their rapes 
often go unprosecuted.
21
  A complex concurrent jurisdictional system and 
mixed messages about state, federal, and tribal responsibilities lessen 
accountability for all law enforcement agencies involved and result in a lack 
of justice for victims. 
The latest enlargement of the jurisdictional system adds little more 
than another piece of legislation to the jurisdictional maze.  On July 29, 
2010, President Barack Obama signed the Tribal Law and Order Act of 
2010 (the Act), the federal government’s solution to the problems faced by 
American Indian and Alaska Native people.
22
  The legislation, lauded as 
“historic”23 and “groundbreaking,”24 does not do enough to protect women 
who have suffered rape and sexual violence.  Despite the good press and 
excitement surrounding the new legislation, it fails to accomplish its stated 
purpose: “to reduce the prevalence of violent crime in Indian country and to 
combat sexual and domestic violence against American Indian and Alaska 
Native women . . . .”25  The amendment does not recognize tribal authority 
to prosecute rape and other serious felonies and continues to restrict tribal 
courts’ authority to adequately punish tribal members. 
This Comment explains the problems with the current criminal justice 
system governing American Indian and Alaska Native people and offers a 
 
19 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
211, § 202(a)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 2261, 2262 (recognizing that “domestic and sexual violence 
against American Indian and Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions”). 
20 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 5 (“Fifty per cent of American Indian and 
Alaska Native women reported that they suffered physical injuries in addition to the rape; the 
comparable figure for women in general in the USA is 30 per cent.” (footnote omitted)). 
21 See id. at 9. 
22 Gale Courey Toensing, Obama Signs ‘Historic’ Tribal Law and Order Act, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 30, 2010), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/07/30/obama-signs-%e2%80%98historic
%e2%80%99-tribal-law-and-order-act-57502.  The Tribal Law and Order Act amended An 
Act to Protect Indian Arts and Crafts Through the Improvement of Applicable Criminal 
Proceeding, and for Other Purposes. 
23 Id. 
24 Larry Cox, President Obama Signs Tribal Law and Order Act, HUM. RTS. NOW—
AMNESTY INT’L USA BLOG (Aug. 2, 2010), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/women/president-
obama-signs-tribal-law-and-order-act. 
25 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, § 202(b)(4). 
2012] “HISTORIC” IN A BAD WAY 501 
critique of and suggestions for the Tribal Law and Order Act.  Specifically, 
this Comment argues that, to better protect Native American women from 
rape and sexual violence and to achieve the policy goal of healing past 
relations with American Indians and Alaska Natives, Congress should 
explicitly recognize concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal 
authorities to prosecute major crimes and remove restrictions on tribal 
authorities’ ability to punish serious crimes such as rape. 
This Comment starts with an overview of the problem of sexual 
violence in Indian Country to provide a clear picture of the unique problems 
facing American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims, and an 
understanding of why modifications to the new legislation are necessary.  
Part II.A explains the extent of the violence, II.B describes criminal 
jurisdiction over Indian Country, and 0 illustrates problems of 
implementation of the current system.  This Comment then takes an in-
depth look at the Tribal Law and Order Act; Part III.A describes how the 
Act changes tribal jurisdiction and Part III.B details the practical effect of 
those changes.  Part IV considers the Tribal Law and Order Act’s viability 
as a solution to the problems discussed in Part II.  Finally, Part V suggests 
modifications that would make the legislation more effective in combating 
sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
Ronnie Tom’s story is far from unusual.  This Part details the sexual 
violence epidemic affecting Indian Country, the difficulty in determining 
which jurisdiction has authority to prosecute and investigate incidents of 
rape and sexual violence, and the practical problems arising out of the 
existing jurisdictional system that the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
seeks to redress. 
A. RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Rape and sexual violence in Indian Country have reached epidemic 
levels.  Data gathered by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
suggests that American Indian and Alaska Native women are over 2.5 times 
more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than other women living in the 
United States.
26
  A DOJ study looking at violence against all American 
women suggested that more than one in three American Indian and Alaska 
Native women will be raped during their lifetimes, compared to less than 
 
26 STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002, at 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf. 
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one in five women in the general population.
27
  DOJ reports that at least 
86% of the reported cases of rape or sexual assault against American Indian 
and Alaska Native women are committed by non-Native men.
28
  A quarter 
of reported sexual violence towards these women is suffered at the hands of 
an intimate partner, while 41% of rapes are committed by strangers.
29
  
These numbers paint a dire picture.  Even more distressing is that some 
anti-rape and human rights organizations think the numbers are a gross 




The sheer magnitude of the rape and sexual violence problem is itself 
shocking, but worse still is the brutality of the rapes suffered by American 
Indian and Alaska Native women.   
Rape is always an act of violence, but there is evidence to suggest that sexual violence 
against American Indian and Alaska Native women involves a higher level of 
additional physical violence.  Fifty per cent of American Indian and Alaska Native 
women reported that they suffered physical injuries in addition to the rape; the 
comparable figure for women in general in the USA is 30 per cent.
31
 
In addition, the identity of those who rape American Indian and Alaska 
Native women makes the already brutal act take on tragic significance.  
While the majority of rapes in the United States are intraracial (white 
women are mostly raped by white men, black women are mostly raped by 
black men, etc.),
32
 rapes of American Indians and Alaska Natives are 
typically committed by non-Native outsiders.
33
  Some have interpreted the 
rapes as a continuation of America’s colonizing relationship with Native 




27 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 22 (2000) (reporting the figure as 34.1%). 
28 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 4. 
29 PERRY, supra note 26, at 8; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the 
extent of sexual violence at the hands of male acquaintances, boyfriends, or husbands and 
highlighting the problems women face with law enforcement officials who do not recognize 
sexual violence between intimate partners as a crime). 
30 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 2 (“Amnesty International’s interviews 
with survivors, activists and support workers across the USA suggest that available statistics 
greatly underestimate the severity of the problem.”). 
31 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 5 (citing Ronet Bachman, The Epidemiology of 
Rape and Sexual Assaults Against American Indian Women: An Analysis of NCVS Data, 
Presentation to Federal and Tribal Working Group on Sexual Assault Against Native 
American Women (Sept. 29, 2003), referenced in Deer, supra note 13, at 457). 
32 Deer, supra note 13, at 457. 
33 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
34 Deer, supra note 13, at 459 (“[W]hen speaking with Native American women who 
have survived rape, it is often difficult for them to separate the more immediate experience 
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American Indian and Alaska Native women are more likely to be 
raped and brutalized during their rapes, and they arguably suffer additional 
mental anguish stemming from the historical significance of the ongoing 
rape and colonization of their tribes.  Additionally, the sexual assault and 
rape of American Indian and Alaska Native women is much more likely to 
be ignored.
35
  As President Obama stated at a conference with tribal leaders, 
“[t]he shocking and contemptible fact that one in three Native American 
women will be raped in their lifetimes is an assault on our national 
conscience that we can no longer ignore.”36 
B. THE JURISDICTIONAL MAZE 
Despite the president’s statement, a complicated jurisdictional maze of 
federal legislation and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence frustrates 
fulfillment of that promise.  The mix of federal, state, and tribal authorities 
responsible for policing and prosecuting incidents occurring in Indian 
Country and by or against American Indian and Alaska Native residents has 
been described by Congress as a “complicated jurisdictional scheme.”37  
Indian reservations are considered domestic dependent nations for which 
the United States “has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide 
for the public safety.”38  The federal government attempted to fulfill these 
obligations by asserting more control over criminal investigations and 
 
of their assault from the larger experience that their people have experienced through forced 
removal, displacement, and destruction.”).  Consider a passage from the diary of one of 
Christopher Columbus’s friends, writing about an encounter with an indigenous woman on 
Columbus’s second voyage to the Americas, for an example of the almost immediate 
initiation of the rape of Native American women by European men upon their arrival in the 
Americas: 
When I was in the boat, I captured a very beautiful Carib woman . . . .  [H]aving brought her into 
my cabin, and she being naked as is their custom, I conceived desire to take my pleasure.  I 
wanted to put my desire to execution, but she was unwilling for me to do so, and treated me with 
her nails in such wise that I would have preferred never to have begun.  But seeing this . . . I took 
a rope-end and thrashed her well, following which she produced such screaming and wailing as 
would cause you not to believe your ears.  Finally we reached an agreement such that, I can tell 
you, she seemed to have been raised in a veritable school of harlots . . . . 
Deer, supra note 13, at 458 (citing Michele de Cuneo, Letter to a Friend, in THE DISCOVERY 
OF AMERICA AND OTHER MYTHS 129 (Thomas Christensen & Carol Christensen eds., 1992)). 
35 See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
36 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President During the Opening of the Tribal 
Nations Conference & Interactive Discussion with Tribal Leaders (Nov. 5, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-opening-
tribal-nations-conference-interactive-discussion-w). 
37 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2261, 
2262. 
38 § 202(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2262. 
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prosecutions involving American Indian and Alaska Native people.
39
  
However, three pieces of legislation and one Supreme Court decision have 
curtailed tribal governments’ power to investigate and prosecute criminal 
offenses: (1) the Major Crimes Act of 1885,
40
 (2) Public Law 280 of 1953,
41
 
(3) the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42
 and (4) Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe in 1978.
43
 
The Major Crimes Act of 1885 marked the first indication that the 
federal government possessed any authority over crimes occurring in Indian 
Country.
44
  The Act authorized federal jurisdiction over “major crimes.”  
These major crimes now include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, 
maiming, assault with intent to commit murder, assault, felony child abuse 
or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and rape, committed by an Indian 
against the “person or property of another Indian or other person.”45 
The Major Crimes Act is ambiguous on two points.  First, it is unclear 
whether the Act provides exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government 
over the enumerated crimes, or if it provides for concurrent jurisdiction 
with tribal courts.
46
  Second, the definitions of the enumerated crimes are 
ambiguous, resulting in substantial litigation aimed at defining them.
47
  
These ambiguities are confusing to both tribal and federal authorities and, 
more importantly, to victims seeking assistance.
48
 
The Major Crimes Act does not explicitly grant exclusive jurisdiction 
to the federal government for the enumerated crimes at the expense of the 
 
39 See Deer, supra note 13, at 460. 
40 Ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). 
41 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 
§ 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). 
42 Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201–203, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1303 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
43 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).  For a general discussion of 
how the four laws interact, see Deer, supra note 13, at 460–63. 
44 Deer, supra note 13, at 460. 
45 Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9. 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
Major Crimes Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes); United 
States v. John, 587 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Tyndall, 400 F. Supp 
949 (D. Neb. 1975) (same).   
47 See DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that assault with 
a dangerous weapon was triable under the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Davis, 429 
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1970) (clarifying that the Major Crimes Act includes the crime of assault 
with a dangerous weapon, but not the lesser included offense of simple assault and battery); 
Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949 (holding that assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury is not 
a crime under the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Davis, 148 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.D. 
1957) (holding that carnal knowledge did not constitute rape under the Major Crimes Act). 
48 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8. 
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tribal court’s own jurisdiction.49  However, courts disagree on whether 
jurisdiction over major crimes is exclusively federal or exists concurrently 
with tribal sovereigns.
50
  Some courts interpret the statute to exclude tribal 
jurisdiction over American Indian and Alaska Native offenders,
51
 while 
others have held that tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction if the crime 




For example, Dan Martin Sam, a member of the Navajo tribe, was 
convicted of raping an American Indian on the Navajo reservation; the 
federal district court in New Mexico sentenced him to twenty years 
imprisonment.
53
  Sam appealed to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that a language 
barrier between Sam and his court-appointed attorney interfered with his 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
54
  Sam 
sought, among other relief, to have the case transferred to Navajo courts.
55
  
However, the Tenth Circuit held that under the Major Crimes Act, 
prosecution of an Indian for rape of another Indian within Indian Country 
was a case beyond the jurisdiction of a tribal court.
56
 
In contrast to Sam, the Ninth Circuit recognized concurrent jurisdiction 
in Wetsit v. Stafne, when it held that a tribal court had the authority to try 
Georgia Leigh Wetsit for stabbing her husband despite Wetsit’s earlier 
acquittal in a federal district court case arising from the same incident.
57
  
The court found that tribes retain inherent sovereignty to prosecute Indians 




49 See also Deer, supra note 13, at 460. 
50 See Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974) (implying that the 
Major Crimes Act stripped tribal courts of jurisdiction of crimes enumerated by the Act); 
Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967) (similar).  But see Wetsit v. Stafne, 
44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing tribes’ concurrent jurisdiction with the federal 
government to prosecute crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act).  In Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a question of whether 
the Major Crimes Act granted the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over enumerated 
crimes committed by Indians, but declined to rule on this issue.  435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 
(1978) (“We have no reason to decide today whether jurisdiction under the Major Crimes 
Act is exclusive.”). 
51 See Felicia, 495 F.2d at 354; Sam, 385 F.2d at 214. 
52 See Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825. 
53 Sam, 385 F.2d at 214–15. 
54 Id. at 214. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 825. 
58 Id.  That the tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is the 
conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject.  See, e.g., WILLIAM 
C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 135 (2d ed. 1988) ( “[T]he great majority 
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Besides the unsettled issue of whether tribes share concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal government over the enumerated crimes, there 
has been some confusion as to what those crimes are.  For example, in the 
limited arena of rape, confusion existed as to whether “rape” as enumerated 
in the Major Crimes Act included statutory rape
59
 and carnal knowledge.
60
  
Through several judicial opinions, “rape” was construed as including only 
common law rape, not statutory rape or carnal knowledge.
61
  Courts 
reasoned that Congress adopted a state law definition of rape by subjecting 
an Indian who commits rape to the same laws and penalties as any other 
person committing the offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States; therefore Congress intended to include only acts that 
constituted common law rape, not carnal knowledge or statutory rape 
(which are not crimes under federal law).
62
  The same confusion as to what 









 and attempted crimes.
67
 
The Major Crimes Act introduced great uncertainty as to the proper 
place to prosecute crimes committed in Indian Country by American Indian 
 
of tribes have for many years exercised jurisdiction over the crime of theft, which duplicates 
larceny, a crime rather surprisingly included in the original Major Crimes Act.”). 
59 Statutory rape is defined as “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age 
of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person’s will.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 1999). 
60 Carnal knowledge is defined as “[s]exual intercourse, esp. with an underage female.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 1999). 
61 See Pocatello v. United States, 394 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Rider, 
282 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1960); Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953); 
Quagon v. Biddle, 5 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1925); United States v. Red Bear, 250 F. Supp. 633 
(D.S.D. 1966); Petition of McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957). 
62 Rider, 282 F.2d at 478–79; see also id. at 480 (holding that “‘rape’ as used in Section 
1153 [does] not encompass the crime of ‘statutory rape’”). 
63 See United States v. Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949 (D. Neb. 1975) (examining whether 
assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury constituted a crime under the Major Crimes 
Act). 
64 See DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1973) (determining that the 
federal courts had jurisdiction over the felony offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, 
but lacked jurisdiction to try simple assault and battery). 
65 See United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (examining whether the sale of 
drugs in Indian Country was punishable under federal jurisdiction despite its omission from 
the list of a major crimes). 
66 See United States v. Gilbert, 378 F. Supp. 82 (D.S.D. 1974) (holding that larceny falls 
within federal jurisdiction regardless of the monetary value of the good). 
67 See United States v. Joe, 452 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that federal 
jurisdiction applies only to attempts to commit crimes specifically enumerated by the Major 
Crimes Act). 
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The second piece of legislation to reassign jurisdiction was Public Law 
280.
69
  Enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 further infringes on tribal 
authority.
70
  Public Law 280 transferred federal criminal jurisdiction, 
obtained by virtue of the Major Crimes Act discussed above, over Indian 
Country in California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
Alaska from the federal government to state governments.
71
  Neither the 
affected states (“public law states”) nor the tribes consented to the new 
arrangement, which forced public law states to assume the additional 




Finally, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) is the third piece 
of federal legislation to constrain tribal jurisdiction.  The ICRA required 
tribal governments to observe the Bill of Rights to protect tribal members’ 
constitutional rights.  For tribal courts, the ICRA meant providing 
procedural and substantive due process, trial by jury, and other 
constitutional rights guaranteed in American courts.
73
  In addition to 
imposing the Bill of Rights on tribal governments, the ICRA limited the 
punishment that a tribe may impose on criminal defendants.
74
  Originally, 
the ICRA limited punishment to a maximum of six months of incarceration 
or a fine of $500, but it was amended in 1986 to increase the maximum 
sentence to one year of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both.
75
 
The ICRA is controversial because of the numerous ways in which it 
restricts tribal sovereignty.
76
  The Act goes beyond paternalism, as it 
 
68 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8 (“The US federal government has created a 
complex interrelation between [tribal, state, and federal] jurisdictions that undermines 
equality before the law and often allows perpetrators to evade justice.”). 
69 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). 
70 Deer, supra note 13, at 461. 
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (“Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table 
shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian 
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over 
offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such 
State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they 
have elsewhere within the State of Territory . . . .”). 
72 Deer, supra note 13, at 460–61. 
73 Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. 




76 Deer, supra note 13, at 461. 
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disrespects tribal sovereignty in a very blatant way: “[t]he message sent by 
this law is that, in practice, tribal justice systems are only equipped to 
handle less serious crimes.  As a result of this limitation on their custodial 
sentencing powers, some tribal courts are less likely to prosecute serious 
crimes, such as sexual violence.”77  When combined with Public Law 280 
and the Major Crimes Act, the ICRA is a practical divestiture of all tribal 
jurisdiction over major crimes committed by American Indians or Alaska 
Natives in Indian Country.
78
 
The Supreme Court recognized the federal government’s de facto 
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes in Oliphant v. Suquamish, when it 
noted that “the issue of exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes was 
mooted for all practical purposes by the passage of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 which limits the punishment that can be imposed by Indian 
tribal courts to a term of 6 months or a fine of $500.”79  As seen in the case 
of Ronnie Tom,
80
 even if a federal prosecutor declines to prosecute a major 
crime and a tribal court seeks to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction by 
prosecuting that tribal member for the crime, the ICRA constrains the tribal 
court’s power to punish the tribal member. 
Oliphant also dealt a blow to tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
defendants who are not American Indian and not tribal members.  Mark 
David Oliphant’s case came to the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas 
corpus.
81
  The tribal court of the Suquamish Indian reservation in 
Washington convicted Oliphant of assaulting a tribal officer and resisting 
arrest.
82
  Oliphant argued that, as a non-Indian permanent resident of the 
reservation, he was not subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction.  The Supreme 
Court, relying on the ICRA, agreed with Oliphant and stripped tribal courts 





77 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 29. 
78 Deer, supra note 13, at 461. 
79 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978). 
80 Riley, supra note 1. 
81 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 195 n.6.  It should be noted that although tribal courts have no criminal 
jurisdiction over non-American Indian non-tribal members, tribal courts do have authority 
over American Indians on their reservation who are not members of their tribe.  This 
includes American Indians from a different tribe, and American Indians from the tribe who 
are not enrolled as official members.  See U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (upholding 
Congress’s amendment to the ICRA, 25 U.S.C § 1301(2) (2006), known as the “Duro fix,” 
which authorized criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians”).  See generally Duro v. Reina, 495 
U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribal authority did not extend to American Indians not 
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The prevalence of non-Indian and American Indian and Alaska Native 
crime occurring in Indian Country has long been recognized as a public 
safety concern.
84
  Legislation and common law suggest that the federal 
government and the Supreme Court consider federal or state law as the 
most appropriate deterrent to these crimes, federal or state law enforcement 
as the best option for policing the reservations, and federal or state courts as 
the most appropriate forum to prosecute criminals terrorizing Indian 
Country.
85
  However, as Figure 1 illustrates, a criminal jurisdictional system 
dependent on so many moving parts, such as the race of the perpetrator and 
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belonging to the tribe), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 
§ 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006)).   
84 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (“[W]e are not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian 
crime on today’s reservations . . . .”). 
85 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. 
86 This flowchart illustrates how the Major Crimes Act, Public Law 280, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, Oliphant v. Suquamish, and the “Duro fix” combine to determine jurisdiction 
over crimes occurring inside or outside Indian Country, and committed by or against 
American Indian and Alaska Native residents of Indian Country. 
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Section C explains why the federal government and Supreme Court are 
misguided and illustrates some of the practical problems arising from the 
confused system existing before the Tribal Law and Order Act.  Section C 
shows how, when so many police agencies, prosecutors, and courts are 
responsible for ensuring safety and order and facilitating victims’ search for 
justice, there is often no justice for American Indian and Alaska Native 
victims of rape and sexual assault. 
C. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE PRE-TRIBAL LAW AND 
ORDER ACT SYSTEM: AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THERE IS NO 
JUSTICE 
The main barriers to justice for American Indian and Alaska Native 
women rape victims are inadequate policing, impediments to prosecution, 
and jurisdictional confusion.
87
  American Indian and Alaska Native women 
often encounter a police force not adequately trained to deal with sexual 
assault and rape crimes; they face delays and failed law enforcement 
responses, inappropriate police responses to allegations, and difficulty 
obtaining forensics examinations such as rape kits.
88
 
These problems stem in part from the jurisdictional confusion created 
by federal legislation and the Oliphant decision.
89
  After a rape, an 
American Indian or Alaska Native woman first has to contact tribal 
authorities, who then must figure out which agency is responsible for the 
investigation, contact that agency, and wait for the agency to travel to 
Indian Country to conduct the investigation.
90
  This is a process that can 
take months because of the lack of a dedicated force of either federal or 
state police to investigate crimes in Indian Country.
91
  “Investigative 
resources are spread so thin that federal agents are forced to focus only on 
the highest-priority felonies while letting the investigation of some serious 
crime languish for years.  Long delays in investigations without arrest leave 
. . . sexual assault victims vulnerable or suspects free to commit other 
crimes . . . .”92 
Inadequate investigation undoubtedly leads to difficulties in 
prosecution.  If an American Indian or Alaska Native woman’s case gets to 
the prosecution stage, there are numerous obstacles affecting the possible 
 
87 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18. 
88 Id. at 41–46. 
89 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
90 Riley, supra note 1. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. 
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prosecuting bodies.  Tribal, state, and federal courts face their own unique 
problems in prosecuting cases of rape that occurred in Indian Country. 
In addition, tribal courts are constrained by the ICRA’s custodial 
incarceration limits.
93
  Tribal courts also suffer from a lack of federal 
funding, out-of-date tribal codes,
94
 and a lack of resources to revamp those 
codes.
95
  Additionally, an expectation that federal prosecutors will pursue 
all serious matters discourages tribes from making the necessary 
investments to improve their courts.
96
  These issues make prosecuting 
perpetrators of rape, sexual assault, and all other major crimes difficult for 
tribal courts. 
On the federal level, the largest impediment to a victim’s justice is a 
federal prosecutor exercising his or her discretion to decline to prosecute a 
case.
97
  Former United States Attorney Margaret Chiara admitted that some 
federal prosecutors actively avoid prosecuting rape cases from Indian 
Country: “I’ve had [Assistant U.S. Attorneys] look right at me and say, ‘I 
did not sign up for this’ . . . they want to do big drug cases, white-collar 
crime and conspiracy.”98  Chiara notes that most federal judges have similar 
feelings: “They will look at these Indian Country cases and say, ‘What is 
this doing here?  I could have stayed in state court if I wanted this stuff.’”99 
Other prosecutors fault poor investigation and lack of forensic 
evidence for the large number of American Indian and Alaska Native rape 
cases that prosecutors decline to prosecute each year.
100
  James A. 
McDevitt, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington,
101
 
explained, “We have the obligation before proceeding to a grand jury to 
make sure we have a prosecutable case. . . .  We’re not in the business of 
 
93 Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011)) (originally limiting punishment to one year of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both; 
now limiting punishment to three years of incarceration, a $5,000 fine, or both); see also 
discussion of ICRA supra Part II.B. 
94 For example, the statute governing the Standing Rock reservation in North and South 
Dakota does not include digital penetration as a form of rape.  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 
18, at 64. 
95 Id. at 63. 
96 Id. 
97 See Riley, supra note 1. 
98 Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bill Moyers 
Journal] (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/11142008/
transcript2.html). 
99 Riley, supra note 1. 
100 Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 98. 
101 The case of Ronnie Tom falls in this district; however, McDevitt could only comment 
generally, and not on the declination of Tom’s case.  Riley, supra note 1. 
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taking cases we’re going to lose.”102  Whatever the reason, federal 
prosecutors decline to prosecute rape cases from Indian Country 65% of the 
time.
103
  Because of federal jurisdiction requirements, rape is not a crime 
generally prosecuted in federal courts.
104
  Therefore, comparisons between 
the rate of declination to prosecute for rapes from Indian Country and rapes 
from the general population are not easily made.  However, in 2000, federal 
prosecutors declined to prosecute about 26% of the cases filed in federal 
court,
105
 a figure substantially lower than the 65% rate of declination to 
prosecute rapes from Indian Country. 
Barriers to justice similar to those present in federal and tribal courts 
exist in state court as well.  The most prominent difficulties in prosecutions 
are discrimination and cultural barriers.
106
  The distance of the court from 
remote Indian Country locations can also be a burden for an American 
Indian or Alaska Native woman seeking justice for her rape.
107
 
Another problem that faces all jurisdictions is one of bringing 
perpetrators in to face prosecution.  Perpetrators sometimes escape 
prosecution by fleeing to a different jurisdiction.
108
  Because jurisdictions 
are rigidly separated into state, federal, or tribal land, perpetrators can easily 
cross borders to escape prosecution.  Perpetrators are able to take advantage 
of the jurisdictional lines unless federal, state, and tribal agencies enter into 
extradition agreements.
109
  For example, in non-public law states a state 
police officer has no jurisdiction to arrest a tribal member on tribal lands for 
a crime committed outside of Indian Country.
110
  This means that a member 
of the Navajo reservation can commit a crime in Albuquerque and return to 
the reservation to be safe from New Mexico state police, unless there is an 
extradition arrangement between the tribe and the state police. 
Once in state or federal court, American Indian and Alaska Native 
women face still more difficulty securing justice.  When their cases are tried 
in federal or state courts, American Indian and Alaska Native women often 
face language and cultural barriers, discrimination, and inadequate jury 
 
102 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Id. 
104 Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.2 (1986). 
105 Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An 
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2004). 
106 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 69–70. 
107 Id. at 69.  For example, in the public law state of Alaska, “cases are prosecuted in 
state courts far away from the villages,” id., often involving an expensive plane ride. 
108 Id. at 39. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
2012] “HISTORIC” IN A BAD WAY 513 
representation.
111
  Often, there is also a hardship in traveling long distances 




The sheer number of sexual assaults and rapes, combined with 
jurisdictional confusion, inadequate policing, and barriers to prosecution, 
put American Indian and Alaska Native women in a vulnerable position.  
Their position prompted President Obama’s assertion that the current 
situation amounts to an “assault on our national conscience” and “an affront 
to our shared humanity.”113  President Obama stressed that “it is something 
that we cannot allow to continue.”114 
American Indian and Alaska Native women are raped more often and 
more violently than any other group of women in the United States.
115
  
Historically, the rape of American Indian and Alaska Native women was 
used as a tool of war.
116
  Presently, these women continue to be raped by 
white men and strangers, a shocking phenomenon considering that the 
majority of rapes are intraracial.
117
  Despite the disproportionally high rape 
rate, American Indian and Alaska Native women face barriers to justice.  
Tribal courts have been stripped of their power to prosecute these crimes, 
and federal and state officials often drop the ball on investigation, follow 
through, and prosecution of rapes and sexual assaults in Indian Country.
118
  
Furthermore, women whose cases do reach the prosecution stage are met 
with the burden of traveling long distances to participate in the trial, and 
face cultural and language barriers with prosecutors.
119
  With all of the 
problems facing American Indian and Alaska Native women, the need for 
an aggressive, proactive solution has been apparent for years.  Part III 
discusses the Tribal Law and Order Act, and the Act’s attempt to remedy 
the problems outlined in Part II. 
III. THE SOLUTION? 
The Senate passed the Tribal Law and Order Act in June of 2010,
120
 
the House followed suit, and President Obama signed the Act into law on 
 
111 Id. at 69–70. 
112 Id. at 71. 
113 Toensing, supra note 22. 
114 Id. (quoting President Obama as he spoke about the rape and sexual violence crisis in 
Indian Country). 
115 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 2–4. 
116 Deer, supra note 13, at 455. 
117 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 8. 
118 Deer, supra note 13, at 457–60. 
119 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 39. 
120 Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261, 2261 (2010). 
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July 29, 2010, with much popular support.
121
  Most tribal governments and 
politicians applauded the Tribal Law and Order Act as “historic,”122 a 
“monumental change,”123 and a “recognition of the tremendous criminal 
justice gap faced by Indian country citizens.”124 
The Act was celebrated as one that “will give American Indian nations 
more authority to fight crime on their lands.”125  It has also been described 
as “a groundbreaking piece of bipartisan legislation that tackles the complex 
jurisdictional maze that allows violent crime against Native American and 
Alaska Native peoples to flourish.”126  This Part will outline the major 
changes introduced by the Act in Section A, and then, in Section B, will 
look at the effect those changes will likely have on the lives of American 
Indian and Alaska Native women. 
A.  THE CHANGES 
The Tribal Law and Order Act first acknowledges that “the United 
States has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the 
public safety of Indian Country.”127  The Act seeks to rectify the outlined 
problems by clarifying the responsibilities of federal, state, tribal, and local 
governments; increasing coordination amongst agencies; empowering tribal 
governments; reducing the prevalence of violent crime in Indian Country; 
combating sexual and domestic violence; preventing drug trafficking and 
reducing the rate of alcohol abuse on reservations; and increasing and 




The Tribal Law and Order Act is organized into seven subtitles, each 
of which addresses one of its stated goals.  Subtitle A addresses federal 
accountability and coordination; Subtitle B discusses state accountability 
and coordination for public law states; Subtitle C outlines provisions and 
steps for empowering tribal law enforcement agencies and governments; 
Subtitle D addresses tribal justice systems; Subtitle E references Indian 
Country crime data collection and information sharing; and finally Subtitle 
 
121 Toensing, supra note 22. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. (quoting Walter Lamar, citizen of the Blackfeet Nation of Montana and president 
and CEO of Lamar Associates, which offers consulting services in areas of law enforcement 
and security). 
124 Id. (quoting Lamar). 
125 Id. 
126 Cox, supra note 24. 
127 Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2261, 2262 
(2010). 
128 § 202(a)(1)–(7). 
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F relates to domestic violence and sexual assault prosecution and 
prevention.
129
  The changes to the current law effected by these subtitles are 
outlined below. 
Subtitle A, dealing with federal accountability and coordination with 
other agencies, attempts to clarify the jurisdictional maze that exists 
between federal and tribal authorities in non-public law states by 
summarizing the jurisdictional system governing major crimes in Indian 
Country.
130
  Subtitle A makes four major changes to the current system of 
federal jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country.  First, it requires the 
appointment of special prosecutors to assist in prosecuting federal offenses 
committed in Indian Country.
131
  The second major change requires the 
appointment of at least one Assistant United States Attorney to serve as a 
tribal liaison for districts that include Indian Country.
132
  The newly 
appointed tribal liaisons will be responsible for coordinating prosecutions, 
developing relationships between the federal government and tribal leaders, 
providing technical assistance and training to tribal justice officers, and 
conducting other activities deemed appropriate by the United States 
Attorney.
133
  Third, Subtitle A requires the establishment of the Department 
of Tribal Justice to serve as a point of contact between tribal governments 
and the federal government for questions on DOJ policies and programs.
134
  
Lastly, Subtitle A establishes a new position, the Native American Issues 
Coordinator, in the DOJ Executive Office for United States Attorneys to 
coordinate prosecutions in Indian Country.
135
 
Subtitle B is relevant to public law states and amends Public Law 280 
to allow tribes to request concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state 
courts
136
 over major crimes.  It also allows tribes to submit applications for 
three-way concurrent jurisdiction between federal, state, and tribal courts.
137
  
Subtitle B stipulates that all changes to jurisdiction achieved through 
Subtitle B must come “[a]t the request of an Indian tribe, and after 
consultation with and consent by the Attorney General.”138  Further, 
Subtitle B encourages state, tribal, and local governments to cooperate 
 
129 §§ 201–266. 
130 §§ 211–214. 
131 § 213(a)(1)(A). 
132 § 213(b). 
133 § 213(b). 
134 § 214(a). 
135 § 214(b). 
136 Public Law 280 gave exclusive jurisdiction to state courts.  18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). 
137 Tribal Law and Order Act, § 221. 
138 Id. 
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through “mutual aid, hot pursuit of suspects, and cross-deputization” 
agreements by offering federal assistance to the parties to such 
agreements.
139
  Federal assistance is available to tribes and state agencies 
regardless of whether the tribe opts for concurrent federal jurisdiction, but 




Subtitle C outlines provisions and steps for empowering tribal law 
enforcement agencies and tribal governments to assist federal agencies.  It 
delineates an agreement between the federal government and tribes to set 
training requirements for tribal police officers.
141
  The goal is to set 
minimum training requirements and give trained individuals the status and 
authority of “Federal law enforcement officer[s].”142 
Subtitles D (Tribal Justice Systems) and E (Indian Country Crime Data 
Collection and Information Sharing) implement major procedural changes 
and establish community programs.
143
  Subtitle D extends the federal 
budget to include programs for alcohol abuse, mental health services, and 
Indian education programs (including youth summer camps).
144
  Subtitle D 
also funds legal representation in tribal courts, finances constructing and 
improving tribal jails, and encourages the appointment and use of probation 
officers.
145
  Subtitle E sets up much-needed procedures to track crimes 
committed in Indian Country and aims to improve the recording of criminal 
histories of repeat offenders.
146
  Currently, Indian Country crime data is 
blended with federal or state crime data as well as with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs; this arrangement presents difficulties in studying problems, 
recognizing trends, and tracking progress.
147
  The new system will track a 
perpetrator’s offenses in federal, state, and tribal jurisdictions and also 
mandates reports to be filed with the federal government that exclusively 
track crime in Indian Country.
148
   
Subtitle F deals specifically with prosecuting and preventing domestic 
violence and sexual assault.  The subtitle creates procedures for prisoner 
release and reentry into Indian Country,
149
 trains Indian Country law 
 
139 § 222. 
140 Id. 
141 § 231(b)(1). 
142 § 231(b)(1). 
143 §§ 241–247, 251–252. 
144 §§ 241–247. 
145 Id. 
146 §§ 251–252. 
147 Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 98. 
148 §§ 251–252. 
149 § 261. 
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enforcement to properly investigate domestic and sexual violence,
150
 
defines procedures for coordination of federal agencies,
151
 establishes a 
sexual assault protocol,
152
 and commits the Comptroller General of the 
United States to conduct a study of the capabilities of Indian Health Service 
facilities in remote Indian reservations and Alaska Native villages.
153
 
Finally, Subtitle G, the last of the Act, establishes the Indian Law 
Enforcement Foundation, sets out qualifications and compensation for those 
serving on the board of directors, and dedicates up to $500,000 of federal 
funding to fund the new organization.
154
  Most important for present 
purposes, the Act amends the ICRA by increasing the maximum custodial 
sentence that tribal courts can apply from one year of incarceration, a 




The seven subtitles of the Tribal Law and Order Act make major 
changes to the current system.  Section B discusses how changes instituted 
by the Tribal Law and Order Act may affect future American Indian and 
Alaska Native rape victims. 
B. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES 
Some constructive provisions contained in the Tribal Law and Order 
Act deserve the overwhelming praise and recognition that accompanied the 
Act’s adoption.  The attention to the problems faced by American Indian 
and Alaska Native rape victims and the public awareness that comes from a 
piece of national legislation have the potential to create serious change.  
The effort to train tribal law enforcement
156
 and the implementation of 
summer and other educational programs for youth living in Indian 
Country
157
 will greatly improve the quality of life for American Indian and 
 
150 § 262. 
151 § 264. 
152 § 265. 
153 § 266. 
154 § 231(c). 
155 § 234(a).  This provision amends 25 U.S.C. § 1302 to say:  
A tribal court may subject a defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than a year but not to 
exceed 3 years for any 1 offense, or a fine greater than $5,000 but not to exceed $15,000, or both, 
if the defendant is a person accused of a criminal offense who (1) has been previously convicted 
of the same or a comparable offense by any jurisdiction in the United States; or (2) is being 
prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense that would be punishable by more than 1 year 
if prosecuted by the United States or any of the States. 
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
156 Tribal Law and Order Act, § 241(f). 
157 Tribal Law and Order Act, § 241(a)(1). 
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Alaska Native communities.  Finally, data sharing amongst agencies
158
 and 
the increased training of tribal law enforcement (especially in the 
specialized area of rape and sexual assault investigations)
159
 will make life 
safer for those living in American Indian and Alaska Native communities. 
Practically, American Indian and Alaska Native women are most 
likely to be directly affected by three areas impacted by the legislation: 
prevention, policing, and prosecution.  American Indian and Alaska Native 
women will notice and benefit from preventative measures and the 
improvement of policing and prosecution because these are the areas that 
rape victims deal with before and after their assaults.  Under the Act, when 
rapes occur, American Indian and Alaska Native women can expect only 
slightly increased prosecution of their cases, but they will receive more 
thorough investigation and medical care. 
Preventative measures most likely will not deter those who rape 
American Indian and Alaska Native women because the prevention 
education is aimed at American Indian and Alaska Native men, who 
commit a small portion of these rapes perpetrated each year.  However, 
increased public awareness and public disdain for the behavior of raping 
American Indian and Alaska Native women may have some effect and aid 
in preventing the cycle of non-Native men raping Native women. 
With the projected training and increased cooperation between the law 
enforcement agencies, American Indian and Alaska Native women can 
most likely expect more thorough and professional investigations into their 
allegations of rape and sexual assault.  Women can expect more formalized 
and predictable investigations, including access to rape kits at medical 
facilities.  With better investigations, it is likely that fewer cases will be 
denied based on a purported lack of evidence.  However, the legislation 
does not provide for extra manpower on rural reservations.  Therefore, 
many crimes will continue to go uninvestigated. 
The Tribal Law and Order Act’s empowerment of federal agencies 
does not make sense.  The Tribal Law and Order Act gives even more 
investigative power to the federal government, which, as shown through the 
current problems, has ignored its duty to American Indian and Alaska 
Native women.
160
  The Act does expand the federal resources available to 
prosecute Indian Country crimes.  However, this is not the first time that the 
federal government has pledged more resources to tribes.  In 2002, the 
federal government dedicated more agents and resources to policing Indian 
Country, but redirected those resources to Homeland Security after the 
 
158 Tribal Law and Order Act, § 251. 
159 Tribal Law and Order Act, § 231. 
160 See discussion supra Part II. 
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September 11th attacks.
161
  Giving more power to the entity that has 
committed a gross dereliction of its duties year after year for more than a 
hundred years defies logic, especially given that, historically, extra federal 
personnel have been dedicated to Indian Country, then later redirected. 
On the front of prosecution, American Indian and Alaska Native 
women face a tough road despite the Tribal Law and Order Act.  The Act 
does nothing to fix or clarify the jurisdictional maze.  “Jurisdictional 
distinctions based on the race or ethnicity of the accused . . . have the effect 
in many cases of depriving victims of access to justice”162 and will most 
likely continue to do the same under the Tribal Law and Order Act.  The 
Act simply adds another layer of jurisdictional confusion by allowing 
public law states to opt in to concurrent state, federal, and (possibly) tribal 
jurisdiction.
163
  Subtitle B makes it an option for three different jurisdictions 
to be concurrently responsible for the crimes occurring in Indian Country.
164
 
Adding another layer exacerbates the confusion and will result in less 
accountability for agencies.  The jurisdictional system is already overly 
complex.  Subtitle B, by giving concurrent jurisdiction to federal courts 
over public law states,
165
 further complicates the matter.  While seeking to 
clarify the jurisdictional maze, the federal government has added more 
confusion by forcing victims to make the determination of whether federal, 
state, or tribal authorities have jurisdiction, rather than just a determination 
between two jurisdictions. 
The Tribal Law and Order Act also creates even more bureaucracy 
through new agencies and new officers, and therefore it adds to the 
jurisdictional maze that already causes problems and confusion amongst 
organizations and, worse, amongst American Indian and Alaska Native 
victims of rape and sexual assault.  Although adding more personnel is 
arguably a step in the right direction, it does nothing to clear up the 
confusion of who should act and when.  Instead of simplifying the roles of 
agencies involved, the Tribal Law and Order Act seeks to solve the problem 
with more people. 
We have already seen how, in the words of journalist Michael Riley, 
“a system with overlapping opportunities for intervention can also fail 
multiple times.”166  But the Tribal Law and Order Act compounds this 
problem, rather than diminishing it.  More people, with no consequential 
 
161 Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 98. 
162 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 30. 
163 See Tribal Law and Order Act, §§ 221–222. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See Riley, supra note 1. 
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mechanism for increased accountability, will not improve the justice system 
available to American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims. 
The legislation also fails to meaningfully address the federal 
prosecutors’ declination rate for prosecuting rapes of American Indian and 
Alaska Native women.  With increased training and more thorough 
investigations, it seems to be Congress’s hope that fewer cases will be 
dismissed, and therefore more rapists and other perpetrators will be brought 
to justice.  However, the legislation does not and arguably cannot combat 
federal prosecutors refusing to prosecute rapes and sexual assault from 
Indian Country because they “didn’t sign up for this” or would prefer 
higher profile cases. 
Although the introduction of a dedicated Assistant United States 
Attorney will likely have some effect on prosecutions, American Indian and 
Alaska Native women will most likely still be deprived of justice due to the 
declination of prosecution by United States Attorneys.  The Act simply 
requires those United States Attorneys to give notice of their decisions not 
to prosecute and offers no incentive or plan to guarantee more prosecutions 
or valid declinations.  Increased resources and attention focused on the 
problems of prosecuting rapes in Indian Country may compel more zealous 
prosecution by federal and state actors, but it is not the best solution.  Tribes 
still maintain the greatest interest in prosecuting these cases.  A piece of 
legislation cannot ensure vigor of prosecution, and in the case of the Tribal 
Law and Order Act, it does not even attempt to curtail prosecutors from 
declining to prosecute low-profile cases discriminatorily. 
The Tribal Law and Order Act will have little impact on the lives of American Indian 
and Alaska Native rape victims in the areas of prevention, policing, and prosecution.  
Scholars studying the issues have noted that the [United States] government has 
interfered with the ability of tribal justice systems to respond to crimes of sexual 
violence by underfunding tribal justice systems, prohibiting tribal courts from trying 
non-Indian suspects and limiting the custodial sentences which tribal courts can 
impose for any one offence.
167
   
The Tribal Law and Order Act offers more of the same interference.  More 
hoops, less sovereignty, and more headaches from its imposed bureaucracy 
constitute the real effects of the Act’s provisions empowering the federal 
government. 
The legislation falls far short of achieving its stated goals.  Even if the 
legislation is considered merely a step in the right direction towards 
achieving these goals, the Tribal Law and Order Act takes several missteps 
towards solving the problems facing American Indian and Alaska Native 
 
167 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 6–8. 
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rape victims and arguably is going in the wrong direction from the desired 
end result. 
IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE LEGISLATION 
The legislation fails in its general approach to the problems facing 
American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims and the tribal governments 
that seek to protect them.  It also fails to address serious problems in the 
system.  The Tribal Law and Order Act does not seek to meaningfully 
empower tribal authorities and does not respect tribal sovereignty, despite 
the fact that the Act states these goals and the idea of empowering tribes to 
handle justice has long been espoused as ideal.
168
  In 1995, Attorney 
General Janet Reno acknowledged the importance of empowering tribal 
judicial systems: 
While the federal government has a significant responsibility for law enforcement in 
much of Indian country, tribal justice systems are ultimately the most appropriate 
institutions for maintaining order in tribal communities.  They are local institutions, 
closest to the people they serve.  With adequate resources and training, they are most 
capable of crime prevention and peace keeping.  Fulfilling the federal government’s 
trust responsibility to Indian nations means not only adequate federal law enforcement 
in Indian country, but enhancement in tribal justice systems as well.
169
 
In a general sense, the legislation is inherently flawed in that it seeks to 




Additionally and more specifically, the Tribal Law and Order Act does 
little to make the situation better for American Indian and Alaska Native 
victims of rape and sexual assault.  For example, Subtitle B is basically a 
game of choose-your-own-conqueror for tribal authorities: tribes in public 
law states are given the choice between allowing the state to maintain 
jurisdiction or giving jurisdiction to a federal government that has long 
neglected its duties to American Indian and Alaska Native rape victims.  
There is no provision for tribes to elect for exclusive jurisdiction; the choice 
provided is between partnering with state authorities, federal authorities, or 
 
168 “[One] purpose[] of this title [is] . . . to empower tribal governments with the 
authority, resources, and information necessary to safely and effectively provide public 
safety in Indian country . . . .”  Tribal Law and Order Act, § 202(b)(3). 
169 Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113, 
114 (1995), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/reno.htm (footnote omitted). 
170 See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act, §§ 211, 213–214, 221–222 (authorizing federal 
jurisdiction in public law states); § 234(a) (increasing the custodial sentencing cap to three 
years of incarceration, a $5,000–$15,000 fine, or both, and therefore continuing the 
“moot[ing],” Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978), of the issue of 
concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction in non-public law states). 
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both.  It’s not a very meaningful choice, and it is insulting to tribal 
sovereignty to offer this as a solution to the problem of serious crimes going 
unpunished in Indian Country.  In giving more power to “outside” 
authorities rather than vesting it back in tribal authorities, the legislation 
blatantly disrespects tribal sovereignty and therefore builds no bridges for 
increased cooperation (another enumerated goal of the legislation).
171
 
In light of expected continuing problems, the federal government 
should adopt further changes to the Tribal Law and Order Act that will 
move towards bringing justice to American Indian and Alaska Native rape 
victims.  The most beneficial modifications to the Act would be to adopt 
concurrent jurisdiction over American Indian and Alaska Native 
perpetrators, remove custodial sentencing caps to allow tribes to punish 
their members, and provide federal funding for tribes to further develop and 
update their judicial systems. 
Adopting concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal authorities 
for major crimes, such as rape, committed by tribal members and 
concurrent jurisdiction with either federal or state authorities (not both) in 
public law states would recognize tribal sovereignty and empower tribes to 
take action to protect American Indian and Alaska Native women.  With 
this concurrent jurisdiction, it is also necessary to remove the limits on 
tribal courts’ ability to punish their own members proportionally for their 
crimes, and to fund the judicial system appropriately. 
Adopting these three changes would avoid all too common 
occurrences of tribal offenders getting off as easily as Ronnie Tom just 
because a federal prosecutor declined to try the case.  Restoring tribal 
authority to prosecute and punish for serious crimes could greatly affect the 
prevention, policing, and prosecution of rapes and sexual assaults in Indian 
Country, but would also serve the higher purpose of mending relationships 
between federal and tribal authorities and would facilitate cooperation to 
combat sexual violence and other crimes. 
It is important to remember that the rape of American Indian and 
Alaska Native women is not a new phenomenon, but that “the United States 
was founded, in part, through the use of sexual violence as a tool, that were 
it not for the widespread rape of Native American women, many of our 
towns, countries, and states might not exist . . . .  Thus, critical to 
contemporary anti-rape dialogues is the inclusion of historical analysis of 
colonization”172 and an attempt to heal this relationship. 
 
171 “[One] purpose[] of this title [is] . . . “to increase coordination and communication 
among Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies . . . .”  § 202(b)(2). 
172 Deer, supra note 13, at 459. 
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The federal government has a responsibility to ensure that women are 
able to enjoy their right to freedom from sexual violence throughout the 
United States—including in Indian Country.173  The federal government has 
promised to protect American Indian and Alaska Native women,
174
 but 
tribal authorities also share this interest and should, therefore, be allowed to 
share in the responsibility.  “As citizens of particular tribal nations, the 
welfare and safety of American Indian and Alaska Native women are 
directly linked to the authority and capacity of their nations to address such 
violence,”175 in part because of the failures of the federal government and in 




The biggest issue is that American Indian and Alaska Native women 
suffer the highest rate of sexual assault in the United States—a form of 
violence that was once used as a weapon of war and colonization against 
them.  Stripping contemporary tribal governments of the ability to prosecute 
many sex offenders and to defend their citizens disrespects tribal 
sovereignty and assigns American Indian and Alaska Native women a 
second-class status.
177
  The legacy of historic abuses persists under the nose 
of the federal government, and American Indian and Alaska Native women 
continue to suffer and to be dehumanized as they have been throughout 
U.S. history.
178
  This history of rape and sexual violence informs present-
day attitudes, of our government and of perpetrators, that help fuel the high 
rates of sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women 
and the high levels of impunity enjoyed by their attackers.
179
 
Removing sentencing caps will do nothing to solve the problem of 
punishing non-Native individuals convicted of rape and sexual violence 
perpetrated in Indian Country against tribe members (which is, admittedly, 
a majority of the offenses perpetrated against American Indian and Alaska 
Native women).  This Act, if amended to eliminate caps, would restore a 
level of sovereignty and respect to tribal jurisdictions.  “For tribal 
governments, defining and adjudicating crimes such as sexual assault can 
 
173 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining accepted standards of human 
rights guarantees by sovereign nations, including the United States). 
174 See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Tribal Law and Order Act. 
175 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 1. 
176 Id. at 30 (“Tribal courts are the most appropriate forums for adjudicating cases that 
arise on tribal land, and . . . state and federal authorities often do not prosecute those cases of 
sexual violence that arise on tribal land and fall within their exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
177 Deer, supra note 13, at 455. 
178 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 18, at 17. 
179 Id. 
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be the purest exercise of sovereignty.  What crime, other than murder, 
strikes at the hearts of its citizens more deeply than rape?”180 
In a history that has been plagued first by conquest, then by trickery, 
and now by paternalism, returning the power to punish would go a long 
way in building partnership and trust. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tribal Law and Order Act was written with American Indian and 
Alaska Native victims in mind.  Therefore, the most important perspective 
in analyzing the legislation’s effectiveness is the victim’s.  If the Act had 
been in effect in 2003 when Ronnie Tom attempted to rape a twelve-year-
old and did rape a seven-year-old, what would be different for the victims?  
The answer, sadly, is not much. 
The legislation cannot force police and prosecutors to care about the 
abuses and hardships faced by American Indian and Alaska Native women 
because the Act cannot create an interest where one does not exist.  The 
new legislation would produce little to no practical difference: Tom would 
serve up to six years
181
 instead of two. 
The only way to achieve justice, fairness, and consistent outcomes is 
to put more trust in tribal governments, and to allow those with an interest 
to make headway against the dire situation of American Indian and Alaska 
Native women.  Tribal courts are the most appropriate forum to try cases 
against American Indian and Alaska Native perpetrators and they should be 
empowered to do so with concurrent jurisdiction and authority to impose 
sentences proportional to the crime. 
 
180 Deer, supra note 13, at 465. 
181 Ronnie Tom received two years based on stacked sentences of one year for each 
crime: the range reflects the maximum Tom would receive (two three-year sentences) and 
the minimum he would likely receive (one three-year sentence).  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
